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ABSTRACT
As the environmental policy recommendations of economists become more acceptable, differences
in the professional understanding of, and support for, different policy forms are becoming more
apparent. These different approaches to environmental policy and research are described around a
taxonomy of four perspectives: “rational analysts;’ “cost analysts;’ “market managers;’ and “free
market environmentalists.” These perspectives are compared and contrasted. Recognition of these
differences can result in a better appreciation of the different research agendas of economists and
can improve clarity in teaching and policy advising.
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The numerous environmental laws put into place
around the time of the first Earth Day addressed
many environmental concerns. The laws designed to
reduce waste discharges to air, land, and water
adopted what has been characterized as “command
and control” regulation. 1 In simplest terms, com-
mand and control regulation requires uniform waste
discharge reduction performance, by a common
technological approach, for all regulated sources.
Technology-based and uniform-performance waste
reduction requirements are written into individual
discharge permits (Ackerman and Stewart 1988).
For example, a common level of pollutant concen-
tration achieved by employing similar wastewater
treatment technologies would be expected at all pub-
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‘The remainder of this paper addresses waste discharge
from point sources. Environmental concerns related to non-
point source waste discharge, to landscape alteration, and to
habitat and species management are not discussed or used
as examples here. However, the framework presented and
the issues discussed can be applied to these areas.
licly owned wastewater treatment plants. These sim-
ilar waste control requirements are imposed on dis-
charge sources without close consideration of the
differences in waste discharge control costs.
These laws have been an environmental success.
Most air and water quality indicators have im-
proved since the early 1970s. This is a significant
accomplishment, considering the increases in pop-
ulation and economic activity that occurred during
the same time. However, in recent years, the com-
mand and control regulatory approach has been
criticized. One theme of the critics is that environ-
mental regulations that are inflexible and insen-
sitive to individual circumstances will result in
higher than necessary cost for achieving environ-
mental goals (Stavins et al. 1988, 1991). A second
criticism is that command and control regulation
will do little to advance pollution control technol-
ogy in the face of continuing economic and popula-
tion growth.
Economists, whcl have made these same criti-
cisms for many years (Kneese and Schultze), gener-
ally recommend creating economic instruments for
reduction of waste discharge. Consequently, they
reject any approach that specifies how much any118 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1996
source must reduce its waste or how that reduction
would be accomplished.z The basic environmental
economics literature describes two different forms
these economic instruments can take (Tietenberg
1994). The “Coasian” approach defines an “ideal”
market where there are two uses for the environ-
ment: waste disposal and non-waste disposal (rec-
reation, production input, etc.). If waste generators
are assigned the rights to the environment, other us-
ers purchase the waste disposal rights in order to
increase non-waste disposal services. Under a dif-
ferent rights assignment, waste generators would
pay others for the right to dispose of wastes, The
payments in either direction are the “price” of
waste disposal uses for the environment.
The second form of economic instruments
could be called an “administered price signal.” In
this approach, a governmental body creates a price
signal through the administration of a subsidy/
charge or tradable quota system. An agency, for in-
stance, might offer a subsidy to a discharger if it
ceases its waste disposal behavior. The failure to
withhold waste is a “price” on waste disposal equal
to the foregone subsidy payment. Alternatively, a
regulatory agency might impose a per unit charge
on waste generating behavior. Another type of price
creation system is one that assigns a predetermined
financial liability to a waste discharger for a dam-
age to third parties. Although damage payments are
not made until harm has occurred, the possibility of
such payments provides an incentive to take mea-
sures that reduce waste disposal. A transferable
(tradable) quota or allowance system is an alterna-
tive to adminiswatively setting a charge or subsidy
on waste disposal (Tletenberg 1985; Hahn and
Stavins). A limited number of rights to discharge
waste are made available, consistent with meet-
ing a politically determined environmental quality
outcome. These rights are assigned to waste dis-
chargers to be traded among them, Limits on allow-
able discharge allowances (or quotas) and a trading
process set the price of a right to discharge.
Many of these policy prescriptions are now
increasingly accepted. The early interest in these
polices was encouraged by a nonpartisan study ef-
2These economic instruments are often called “market-
based” or “incentive-based” environmental policies.
fort, “Project 88;’ sponsored by Senators Timothy
Wirth (D-Colorado) and the late John Heinz (R-
Pennsylvania) (Stavins et al. 1988, 1991). The in-
fluence of the Project 88 arguments on political
leadership was immediate. For example, during
the Bush administration, Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) administrator William Reilly argued
that “to maintain progress toward our environmen-
tal goals, we must move beyond a prescriptive
[command and control] approach by adding inno-
vative policy instruments such as economic incen-
tives” (U.S. EPA 1991).
Some environmental groups, which had long
been antagonistic toward the economist’s environ-
mental policy prescriptions (Shabman 1984), be-
came proponents. For instance, the Environmental
Defense Fund (EDF) was instrumental in the de-
sign and acceptance of the nutrient trading system
for North Carolina’s Tar-Pamlico river basin
(Rader), and regularly advocates the use of allow-
ance trading programs under the Clean Air Act
(EDF Letter). More recently, President Clinton’s
administration announced that it would increase re-
liance on market-based solutions to decide how to
clean up the environment (U.S. EPA 1995). One of
the first bills introduced under the new Republican
leadership of the House of Representatives (H.R.
9) called upon federal agencies to “employ market-
based mechanisms that permit greatest flexibility in
achieving benefit” (U.S. Congress, House).
Economists are now asked to move from text-
book theory to policy-relevant research and advis-
ing. In this effort, they are discovering differences
in the professional understanding of, and profes-
sional support for, varying forms of economic in-
struments. This has led to debates over the environ-
mental economics research agenda and over the
appropriate policy advice to be offered by environ-
mental economists.3 However, differences of view
are not well recognized or understood among most
economists, Our purpose is to describe these differ-
ences and their professional implications. Our dis-
cussion is organized around a taxonomy describ-
ing four economic perspectives on environmental
3For example, refer to the January 1995 issue of Cmr-
temporary Economic Policy for several articles illustrating
this point.Shabman and Stephenson: Environmental Policy Reform 119
policy: “rational analysts;’ “cost analysts;’ “market
managers;’ and “free market environmentalists .“
Individual economists’ views may not fit neatly
into one of the categories, but the stark contrasts we
draw will serve to highlight important and funda-
mental differences in professional views. Recogni-
tion of these differences will result in a better ap-
preciation of economists’ diverse research agendas




Rational analysts are those economists who advo-
cate economic efficiency as a dominant concern in
the development of environmental goals and who
believe that the best choice among command and
control and the different approaches to putting a
price on waste disposal can be determined by bene-
fit/cost analysis techniques. The rational analyst
makes an efficiency calculation before recom-
mending an environmental quality goal and the in-
strument to achieve the goal. The rational analyst
might favor economic instruments in principle,
but admits command and control to the suite of po-
lices that are considered for this empirical evalu-
ation.
Rational analysts begin an evaluation by assum-
ing some initial assignment of responsibility for
pollution reduction. The step of assigning financial
responsibility for the cost of waste discharge con-
trol directs the choice of policies. For instance, if it
is decided the polluter should bear the responsibil-
ity of reducing effluent discharge (i.e., polluter
pays), then command and control or an emission
tax, but not a subsidy, would be an acceptable pol-
icy, The assignment of financial responsibility is
equivalent to the assignment of property rights as a
precondition to determining the appropriate mea-
sure of economic surplus for benefit assessment
(willingness to pay versus willingness to accept
compensation) (Schmid). With these initial condi-
tions established, the analysts can move to the cen-
tral activity of benefit/cost analysis. The benefit/
cost analysis yields recommendations for two re-
lated dimensions of the environmental management
problem: the efficient level of environmental qual-
ity and the policy instruments to achieve that effi-
cient level.
The analyst envisions a wide array of states of
nature (e.g., ambient water quality in a stream) as-
sociated with waste discharge from high levels to
zero discharge.4 Each of these water quality states
has a money equivalent value to the people who
find their utility increased by changes in the envi-
ronmental condition. The analyst sets out to make
money equivalent measures of these different util-
ity levels—benefits-from different reductions in
waste disposal. Next, the costs for achieving each
of the different benefit levels are measured. To
compute costs of different policies, rational ana-
lysts envision a response function relating a given
policy approach (command and control, charge,
subsidy, discharge allowance trading, or “Coasian-
like” bargaining) to waste disposal behavior and
waste disposal costs. Costs include outlays for
waste generators’ capital, operation, and legal and
information costs for compliance with the policy
regime.
Another cost is the foregone value of market
output (opportunity cost) that might rise with in-
creased levels of waste discharge reduction, As a
general matter, most economists believe that these
costs are higher under command and control regu-
lation than under incentive-based policies. The
logic of this conclusion has made its way into un-
dergraduate textbooks (Tietenberg 1994), but the
magnitude of the cost difference is an empirical
question for the rational analyst.
A third cost category includes information,
monitoring, and enforcement costs to implement
and administer different forms of command and
control and incentive-based policies. These costs
have received less attention from economists, but
also must be made a part of the rational analyst’s
benefiticost computation.
Analytical barriers of time, data, and study re-
sources may prevent a complete beneftticost analy-
sis. Still, the rational analyst would (at least in con-
cept) want to strive for the combination of the level
of waste reduction and policy strategy that yields
the greatest measured net benefits (i.e., is the most
4A response function relating waste reduction to envi-
ronmental quality is assumed to be available.120 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1996
efficient) in order to make environmental policy
recommendations.
The Cost Analyst
Cost analysts are wary of the benefit measurements
of the rational analysts. While they believe that
more research will advance the state of the art, they
feel that current technical limitations make reliance
on benefit measures for policy advocacy profes-
sionally indefensible. These economists might sup-
port the introduction of empirical benefit estimates
into the public debate over the selection of the “ap-
propriate” level of environmental quality, but reluc-
tantly concede that selection of an environmental
goal is a decision for the political process.
Therefore, cost analysts view environmental de-
cision making as a two-stage process.s In the first
stage, decisions are made on desired environmental
goals and waste discharge reduction, as well as on
the assignment of responsibility for achieving these
goals (Stavins et al. 1988; Ackerman and Stewart
1985, 1988), Examples of environmental goals set
through political processes include the federal no-
net-loss of remaining wetlands and the 40% nitro-
gen and phosphorous reduction goal established for
the Chesapeake Bay.
The second-stage policy question is: “How are
we to best achieve our environmental goals?’ This
second stage is where the cost analysts focus their
professional attention. The primary policy objec-
tive of these economists is to assure that the envi-
ronmental goals are achieved by those sources with
the lowest measured marginal cost of waste reduc-
tion. With this in mind, the analyst conducts inten-
sive empirical cost-effectiveness studies for the
whole range of policy options, including command
and control, administered price, and Coasian
systems. Taking the environmental objectives as
largely given, the cost analyst’s quantification of
costs is conducted the same way as the rational ana-
lyst’s cost analysis. A comprehensive cost analysis
would take into account not only pollution control
‘Current command and control policy also uses the two-
part approach of selecting an environmental goal (as a func-
tion of desired waste discharge reduction) before designing
the performance and technological requirements that will be
assigned to each source.
costs, but also transaction and public costs (Stav-
ins). The cost analyst’s recommendations for choice
among an entire set of economic policy instruments
will be based on the outcomes of the cost measure-
ment studies.
The Market Manager
Market managers, like cost analysts, see environ-
mental decision making as a two-stage process. In
the first stage, political decisions are made on de-
sired environmental goals and on the assignment of
responsibility for achieving these goals. Unlike the
analysts, however, the market managers are eager
to concede the choice of environmental goal to the
political process. For them, the selection of the
desirable level of environmental quality involves
social values that always will escape the benefit cal-
culations. Likewise, market managers do not advo-
cate a particular assignment of waste reduction
responsibilities—since this assignment of respon-
sibility is ultimately grounded in the beliefs of
members of society as to what is considered equi-
table.
Market managers focus their professional and
policy attention on the second-stage issue of select-
ing policies to achieve environmental objectives. At
this point, the rational analysts, cost analysts, and
market managers might all advocate the same set
of economic instruments. There is one significant
difference in viewpoint, however, which causes
market mangers to exclusively advocate economic
instruments. Market managers emphasize the need
to create a continuing incentive for waste dis-
chargers to seek new ways to lower the marginal
cost of waste reduction. For this reason, command
and control regulation, which may be admitted into
the analysts’ choice set, is not considered. In com-
mand and control, the desire to develop innovative
control strategies is muted since the financial incen-
tive to reduce discharges ends once the mandated
technology for waste control has been installed and
is being operated.
By contrast, if a price on waste discharge is part
of the cost of production, then the waste generator
will continuously search for innovative waste dis-
posal reduction strategies. Market managers stress
this technology-forcing dynamic of financial incen-
tives, over the static economic efficiency result
from their use. Therefore, the market managers notShabman and Stephenson: Environmental Policy Reform 121
only are unconcerned about benefit measurement,
but also are unconcerned with predicting the cost
savings that might be achieved under the different
instruments. In fact, these economists note that any
control cost estimates made before the incentive-
based policy is implemented will be too high.
Market managers focus on the designs and the
public costs of specialized waste discharge rights
markets or charges and subsidies to manage market
behavior. They argue that such costs are always
worth bearing in order to tap the dynamic power
of price incentives. Rather than accept the general
designs for such instruments or devote professional
energy into cost-estimation techniques, the market
manager will devote professional effort into the
careful, situation-sensitive design of the instru-
ments. Attention to design means that public imple-
mentation costs are minimized, incentive structures
are properly constructed, and implementation fea-
sibility/political acceptance is enhanced.
The Free Market Environmentalis~
Economists with a fourth perspective, self-labeled
as “free market environmentalists:’ are closely
aligned with the public choice/Austrian traditions
in economics. These economists believe that the
appropriate level of environmental quality (i.e., al-
location of the environment among competing
uses) can be defined by freely trading individuals
(Anderson and Leal). For the free market environ-
mentalist, the instrument of environmental policy
is well-defined, enforced, and transferable private
property rights for all the services of the environ-
ment: waste disposal, aesthetics, factor of produc-
tion, and life support.
The assurance of nonattenuated rights to all of
these services for individuals and groups defines
one role of the political process. Once rights are as-
signed, liability rules based on common law tradi-
tions (or new property rules) stimulate market trade
for the multiple uses of the environment (Calabresi
and Melamed; Landes and Posner). In turn, the uses
of the environment are exchanged like typical con-
sumer goods. For instance, if local residential de-
velopment has been granted property rights to a
shared lake, a potential industrial discharge source
would have to bargain with the neighborhood asso-
ciation for the right to discharge a certain amount
of effluent into the lake. The outcome of this bar-
gaining process among free-trading private individ-
uals will determine the level of environmental qual-
ity in the lake. Thus, the role of government is
effectively eliminated from environmental goal set-
ting and the selection of pollution control strate-
gies. The focus on private bargaining suggests the
appropriate role of governmental process be limited
to actions in the definitions of rights and in other
arenas that will reduce the costs of transaction.
Comparing the Alternative Perspectives
As the above discussion suggests, there are substan-
tial differences of view among these four economic
perspectives on environmental policy. These four
perspectives arise from different opinions about
three issues: the appropriate role for the political
process, the place of calculation in making environ-
mental policy, and the responsibility of economists
in detailed policy design. The rational analyst, cost
analyst, market manager, and free market environ-
mentalist each holds a unique set of views related
to these issues. Table 1 offers a summary of these
perspectives.
Both rational analysts and free market environ-
mentalists worry about possible “inefficiencies” of
selecting the level of environmental quality in a po-
litical process. To a lesser extent, this is a concern
of cost analysts. Both groups base their concern on
perceived limitations of contemporary democratic
processes. The equally fervent subscriptions to
rent-seeking theories of political process (Shabman
1995) support this common skepticism of the polit-
ical process, but do not lead to common solutions.
Rational analysts would restrict political deci-
sion makers to implementing the goals and policy
instruments identified by a benefiticost calculation.
For them, sound environmental policy cannot be
made without such information, and this calls for a
research agenda dedicated to measuring and re-
porting on net benefits. This becomes the profes-
sion’s most central contribution to environmental
policy (Hanemann).
Economists who adopt this perspective will be
more comfortable offering advice to decision mak-
ers grounded in empirical studies. Indeed, some
economists argue that we are currently wasting our
professional time on design of incentive-based in-
struments, because the environmental goals to be
achieved by such instruments are ill-advised. They122 Journal ofAgricultural and Applied Economics, July 1996
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believe that such goals can only be changed by
more attention to the gains derived in relation to the
adverse consequences to the economy. While not
all would advocate a comprehensive evaluation of
benefits and costs called for by the framework of
the rational analyst, rational analysts do want the
profession to become vocal in criticizing the goals
of current environmental laws (Crandall).
Those holding the free market environmentalist
perspective place little faith in calculated benefit
and cost numbers. First, they dispute the possibility
that those calculating them can be impartial (objec-
tive). More than doubt about impartial professional
colleagues, however, is at issue. Free market envi-
ronmentalists do not believe that meaningful bene-
fit estimates are conceptually possible. The search
for a stable and precise benefit estimate is mis-
placed because people’s preferences are learned
over time and between choice circumstances in re-
sponse to new experiences and information. In this
Austrian view, marginal values cannot be inferred
from prices and therefore are not subject to calcula-
tion, but instead are discovered and revised through
market exchange (Dolan; Baird).
Terry Anderson (1982, p. 933) reflects both con-
cerns in his rejection of the rational analyst per-
spective because it has “implicitly assumed that
knowledge is given and that it will be used by
dispassionate, highly organized, and professional
technicians,” Then, for the free market environmen-
talist, the evolving values motivate new definitions
of property rights and liability rules consistent with
the emerging and shifting values for the environ-
ment. Property institutions emerge to reflect new
values, if the political process does not intrude (An-
derson and Hill). Thus, in the end, free market envi-
ronmentalists believe that appropriate environmen-
tal goals can only be defined through individual
exchanges made in true market processes, and not
in the political arena or by rational analysts.
Like the free market environmentalists, market
managers reject benefit estimation as a way to
quantify people’s preferences for alternative uses of
the environment. Unlike the free market environ-
mentalists, market mangers accept the environmen-
tal goals set in the political arena. For market man-
agers, benefits and costs are revised and discovered
during the continuing deliberative processes that
characterize the political decision-making experi-
ence (Lindblom). Market managers would admit all
forms of argument and evidence to a political
debate that addresses the merits of extant environ-
mental goals. Indeed, market managers may be
sympathetic with the rational analysts’ call for a
constant consideration of gains and costs from any
environmental program, but would argue for recon-
sideration of environmental goals using economic
concepts of opportunity costs and marginal values
instead of stressing empirical measurements. Mar-
ket managers also would advocate that the actual
(not estimated) cost of different policies becomes
information that feeds back to political decision
processes seeking to revise environmental goals.
The free market environmentalist and the mar-
ket manager both rely on processes instead of cal-
culation to arrive at environmental goals. The dif-
ference between the two perspectives centers on
what is viewed as the appropriate decision-making
process for synthesizing environmental values—
individual market choice in one case, or collective
choice in the other. The focus on benefit and cost
discovery processes in different domains directs
the market manager’s and the free market environ-
mentalist’s research agenda to the details of policy
design.
The market manager considers a range of eco-
nomic policy instruments, but places emphasis on
administered price systems such as tradable waste
discharge rights and taxes or subsidies to alter
the production and consumption decisions over
Coasian-type bargaining. Market managers accept
and believe in the potential of financial incentives
to create a dynamic process of cost reduction to
meet political goals. Thus, their policy attention
turns primarily to the design and refinement of an
institutional framework capable of tapping this dy-
namic cost-reduction process. Recent attention to
the questions of reducing transactions costs and in-
creasing the certainty of waste discharge allowance
rights when creating a system of tradable pollution
rights (once a politically determined cap on total
discharge has been set) illustrates the nature of this
concern (U.S. General Accounting Office; Letson).
Free market environmentalists place their em-
phasis on how to assign certain rights to the envi-
ronment for all uses, not just waste discharge. Then
the free market environmentalist focuses design at-
tention to reducing transactions costs among all us-
ers of the environment so that an environmental
goal arises from trade in all rights to the environ-124 Journal ofAgricultural and Applied Economics, July 1996
ment. The central difference between the two is
over the commodity to be traded—a pollution al-
lowance or all rights to use of the environment.
Thus, there is a common attention to systems that
can reduce transactions costs among buyers and
sellers. However, profound differences remain as
free market environmentalists reject the policy in-
struments of charges, subsidies, and pollution al-
lowance markets advocated by market managers.
At one level, free market environmentalists find
administered price instruments unworkable. For
example, they argue that the political process that
controls the number of allowances in a pollution
rights trading system always will create uncertainty
that will make potential market participants reluc-
tant to exploit the cost-saving potential of an allow-
ance market (Smith; Kellogg). Similar uncertainty
about charges and subsidies would be described as
barriers to investments in waste reduction technol-
ogy. While these criticisms are recognized, market
managers would respond by suggesting that cer-
tainty will improve with better design and more ex-
perience.
The more fundamental challenge posed by the
free market environmentalists to all three perspec-
tives is the recommendation that environmental
goal setting should be entrusted to a full market
process. One critic of the policies recommended by
the market managers states:
Market-based policies [tradable pollution allow-
ances, charges, and subsidies] essentially are de-
signed to induce companies to reduce pollution
in a more efficient manner. However, they do
nothing to address the political problems inherent
in government-determined environmental quality
(Smith, p. 69).
A central role for government is to remove legal
and other impediments that stand in the way of cre-
ating a more comprehensive set of property rights,
and to enforce the outcomes of these bargains. At
this point, critics note that many environmental
problems do not lend themselves to low cost identi-
fication of the bargaining parties or monitoring and
enforcement of waste disposal behavior (such as
suggested by the lake illustration discussed above).
For example, air pollutants come from numerous
sources and travel long distances, and so those who
might have a right to “clean air” could not readily
secure compensation from those whose waste dis-
charge diminishes the value of the right.
The free market environmentalist might ac-
knowledge the comment, but will suggest that tech-
nologies will be developed in response to such
problems if the incentives to trade are first put in
place by the development of free market environ-
mental policies. As evidence, they cite the enclo-
sure of the western range. As western lands were
settled and land became relatively scarce, conflicts
arose over use and access of the land. Such conflicts
stimulated the creation of a new technological
development—barbed wire—to enclose the vast
western expanses (Anderson and Hill; Kellogg), In
a more contemporary context, Smith suggests that
airshed could be privatized through technological
developments that allow air emissions for specific
sources to be chemically “labeled” and tracked. In
this way, if owners of a right to clean air were
harmed, they would be able to identify the origin of
the pollutant and seek compensation.
Summary and Conclusions
At a general level, economists would all agree that
economic instruments are a more desirable way
to design environmental programs than traditional
command and control. Beneath this general con-
ceptual agreement, however, differences in eco-
nomic perspectives suggest dissimilar research and
policy agendas. Rational analysts and cost analysts
align themselves with a research agenda of compu-
tation that is reinforced with strong professional
recognition of empirical studies, Market managers
and free market environmentalists reject this com-
putational mind set and agree that economists
must be pro-active in institutional design. Yet, the
market managers and free market environmental-
ists part company on the acceptability of political
processes for environmental management decision
making.6
In the end, different perspectives on the politi-
cal process yield different research agendas and
policy recommendations. Understanding the basis
for disagreement will be important for practicing
6This particular disagreement stems from a far more ba-
sic dispute over the role of government in all areas (Payne),>hannan ana >tepnenson: .mwronmenral Youcy KeJorm
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policy economists who are asked to explain (teach)
and provide advice on “incentive-” or “market-
based” approaches to environmental policy.
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